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We study the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous resource, com-
monly known as cake cutting and chore division, in the presence of strategic
agents. While a number of results in this setting have been established in
previous works, they rely crucially on the free disposal assumption, meaning
that the mechanism is allowed to throw away part of the resource at no cost.
In the present work, we remove this assumption and focus on mechanisms
that always allocate the entire resource. We exhibit a truthful envy-free
mechanism for cake cutting and chore division for two agents with piecewise
uniform valuations, and we complement our result by showing that such a
mechanism does not exist when certain additional assumptions are made.
Moreover, we give truthful mechanisms for multiple agents with restricted
classes of valuations.
1 Introduction
Given a heterogeneous divisible resource and a set of interested agents with potentially
differing valuations on different parts of the resource, how can we allocate the resource
to the agents in such a way that all agents perceive the resulting allocation as fair? The
resource is often modeled as a cake in the literature, and the problem, which therefore
commonly goes by the name of cake cutting, has occupied the minds of mathematicians,
computer scientists, economists, and political scientists alike for the past seventy years
[7, 18, 21, 22, 23]. Cake in the cake cutting problem is used to represent a desirable
resource; all agents wish to maximize the amount of resource that they receive. In
contrast, the dual problem to cake cutting, known as chore division, aims to allocate
an undesirable resource to the agents, with every agent wanting to receive as little of
the resource as possible. Though several algorithms for cake cutting also apply to chore
division, the theoretical properties of the two problems differ in many cases, and much
less work has been done for chore division than for cake cutting [10, 12, 13, 19, 20].
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Perhaps the simplest and most well-known fair division protocol is the cut-and-choose
protocol, which works for both cake cutting and chore division with two agents. The
protocol operates by letting the first agent divide the resource into two parts that she
values equally, and letting the second agent choose the part that she prefers. The
resulting allocation is always envy-free—each agent likes her part at least as much as
the other agent’s part, and proportional—both agents find their part better than or equal
to half of the entire resource. However, the protocol has the disadvantage that it is not
truthful, meaning that a strategic agent can sometimes benefit from misreporting her
valuation to the protocol. For example, if the first agent values the whole cake equally,
according to the protocol she will divide the cake into half and get half of her value
for the entire cake. However, if she knows that the second agent only cares about the
leftmost quarter of the cake, she can divide the cake into the leftmost quarter and the
rest, knowing that the second agent will choose the left part and leave her with three-
quarters of the cake. The failure to satisfy truthfulness renders the protocol difficult to
participate in, since the first agent needs to guess the second agent’s valuation in order
to find a beneficial manipulation.
This issue was first addressed by Chen et al. [9], who gave a truthful deterministic cake
cutting mechanism that is Pareto optimal, envy-free, and proportional for any number
of agents with piecewise uniform valuations. Chen et al.’s result shows that fairness and
truthfulness are compatible in the allocation of heterogeneous resources. Nevertheless,
their result hinges upon a pivotal assumption known as the free disposal assumption,
which says that the mechanism is allowed to throw away part of the resource without
incurring any cost.1 While certain resources such as cake or machine processing time
may be easy to get rid of, for other resources this is not the case. For instance, when we
divide a piece of land among antagonistic agents or countries, we cannot simply throw
away part of the land, and any piece of land left unallocated constitutes a potential
subject of future dispute. The free disposal assumption is even less reasonable when it
comes to chore allocation—indeed, with this assumption we might as well simply dispose
of the whole chore altogether!
With this motivation in mind, we consider in the present paper the problem of fairly
and truthfully dividing heterogeneous resources without the free disposal assumption.
Not having the ability to throw away part of the resource makes the task of the mech-
anism more complicated. The reason is that even if the mechanism is only allowed to
throw away parts that are not valued by any agent, this already prevents agents from
gaining by not reporting parts of the resource that no other agent values, in the hope of
getting those parts for free along with a larger share of the remaining parts. As Chen et
al. [9] noted, getting rid of the free disposal assumption adds “significant complexity”
to the problem, since the mechanism would have to specify exactly how to allocate parts
that no agent desires. The same group of authors also gave an example illustrating that
removing the assumption can be problematic even in the special case of two agents with
1Note that free disposal does not preclude Pareto optimality. The mechanism can throw away parts of
the resource not valued by any agent and still maintain Pareto optimality; this is exactly what Chen
et al.’s mechanism does.
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very simple valuations. Indeed, could it be that there is an impossibility result once we
dispose of free disposal?
1.1 Our Results
Throughout the paper, we focus on deterministic mechanisms that are required to allo-
cate the entire resource, which we model as an interval [0, 1]. We assume that agents have
piecewise uniform valuations, meaning that for each agent the cake can be partitioned
into desired and undesired intervals, and the agent has the same marginal utility for any
fractional piece of any desired interval. We investigate the compatibility of truthfulness
and fairness in this setting.
First, in Section 3 we exhibit a truthful, envy-free, and Pareto optimal cake cutting
mechanism for two agents (Theorem 1). At a high level, the mechanism lets the two
agents “eat” their desired intervals of the cake at the same speed but starting from
different ends of the cake. Using a simple reduction from chore division to cake cutting,
we also derive a chore division mechanism for two agents with the same set of properties
(Theorem 2).
Next, in Section 4 we show that if we add certain requirements for the mechanism on
top of being fair and truthful, then no desirable mechanism exists even for two agents. In
particular, the impossibility holds when we make any one of the following assumptions
in addition to truthfulness and envy-freeness: (i) anonymity—the mechanism must treat
all agents equally (Theorem 3); (ii) connected piece assumption—the mechanism must
allocate a single interval to each agent (Theorem 4); and (iii) position obliviousness—the
values that the agents receive depend only on the lengths of the pieces desired by various
subsets of agents and not on the positions of these pieces (Theorem 5).
Finally, in Section 5 we consider the more general setting where there are multiple
agents. We assume that each agent only values a single interval of the form [0, xi]. We
present a truthful, envy-free, and Pareto optimal cake cutting mechanism (Theorem 6)
and a truthful, proportional, and Pareto optimal chore division mechanism (Theorem 7)
for any number of agents with valuations in this class.
1.2 Related Work
Cake cutting has been a central topic in the area of fair division and social choice for
decades. While the existence and computation of fair allocations have been extensively
studied [2, 3, 6, 11, 24, 25], the work of Chen et al. [9] that we mentioned earlier was the
first to consider incentive issues. As with Chen et al., Maya and Nisan [15] considered
piecewise uniform valuations and gave a characterization of truthful and Pareto optimal
mechanisms for two agents. Recently, Alijani et al. [1] presented a truthful envy-free
mechanism in the setting where every agent values only a single interval.
For valuation functions beyond piecewise uniform, most results are negative. For
example, for piecewise constant valuations, Aziz and Ye [4] showed that there is no
truthful and robust proportional mechanism, two works [5, 16] showed that there is no
proportional mechanism that allocates connected pieces or is non-wasteful, and Bei et al.
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[5] also showed that there is no truthful mechanism that satisfies position obliviousness.
In the Robertson-Webb query model, Kurokawa et al. [14] showed that there is no
truthful envy-free mechanism with bounded queries, while Braˆnzei and Miltersen [8]
proved that any deterministic truthful mechanism for two agents must be a dictatorship.
In all of the works above, either the free disposal assumption is made, or it is assumed
that every piece of the cake is valuable for at least one agent. In contrast, in our work
the mechanism is required to always allocate the entire cake. Finally, all aforemen-
tioned results are restricted to deterministic mechanisms. If one allows randomization,
several truthful in expectation mechanisms that guarantees either proportionality or
envy-freeness have been proposed [8, 9, 17].
2 Preliminaries
We consider a heterogeneous divisible resource, which we represent by the interval2
[0, 1]. A piece of the resource is a finite union of disjoint intervals. The resource is
to be allocated to n agents a1, a2, . . . , an. Each agent ai has a density function fi :
[0, 1] 7→ R+ ∪ {0}, which captures how the agent values different parts of the resource.
We assume that the agents have piecewise uniform valuations, i.e., for each agent ai, the
density function fi takes on the value 1 on a finite set of intervals and 0 on the remaining
intervals. The value of agent ai for a subset S ⊆ [0, 1] is defined as vi(S) =
∫
S
fi dx,
which is equivalent to the total length of the intervals in S on which fi takes on the
value 1.3 Let Wi ⊆ [0, 1] denote the piece on which fi = 1. We refer to a setting with
agents and their density functions as an instance.
An allocation of the resource is denoted by a vector A = (A1, A2, . . . , An), where Ai is
a union of finitely many intervals that represents the piece of the resource allocated to
ai, and Ai∩Aj = ∅ for any i 6= j. We consider two different types of resources: desirable
resources, which we represent by a cake, and undesirable resources, which we represent by
a chore. We refer to the problem of allocating the two types of resources as cake cutting
and chore division respectively. The agents want to maximize their value for their piece
in cake cutting and minimize this value in chore division. Two fairness properties that we
consider are envy-freeness and proportionality. In cake cutting, we say that an allocation
(A1, A2, . . . , An) is envy-free if for every agent ai, we have vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj) for any j. In
other words, ai cannot obtain a larger value from any other agent’s share. The allocation
is said to be proportional if vi(Ai) ≥ vi([0, 1])/n. Envy-freeness and proportionality are
defined analogously in chore division but with the inequality signs reversed.
A mechanism is a function M : (f1, f2, . . . , fn) 7→ (A1, A2, . . . , An). That is, given
the input density functions of the agents, the mechanism computes an allocation for
the agents. We only consider deterministic mechanisms in this paper, meaning that
the allocation is completely determined by the input density functions. Moreover, we
2Sometimes we will denote the resource by an arbitrary interval [a, b] for simplicity; this can be easily
normalized back to [0, 1].
3In some papers, valuations are normalized so that vi([0, 1]) = 1 for all i. We do not follow this
convention.
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assume that the mechanism has to allocate the entire resource to the agents, i.e., in
any allocation (A1, A2, . . . , An) returned by the mechanism,
⋃n
i=1Ai = [0, 1]. In other
words, the mechanism does not have free disposal. Note that when the entire resource is
allocated, envy-free implies proportionality, and both notions are equivalent in the case
of two agents.
We end this section by defining a number of properties of mechanisms that we consider
in this paper. Given a vector of input density functions f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn), let Lf be the
indicator function that maps f to a vector with 2n components, where each component
corresponds to a distinct subset of agents and the value of the component is the length
of the piece desired only by that subset of agents.
Definition 1. A mechanism M : (f1, f2, . . . , fn) 7→ (A1, A2, . . . , An) is said to satisfy
• envy-freeness, if it always returns an envy-free allocation;
• proportionality, if it always returns a proportional allocation;
• truthfulness, if it is a dominant strategy for every agent to report her true density
function;
• Pareto optimality, if for any allocation returned by the mechanism, there does not
exist another allocation that makes no agent worse off and at least one agent better
off with respect to the same density functions;
• the connected piece assumption, if each Ai is always a single interval;
• anonymity, if the following holds: For any density functions f1, f2, . . . , fn and
any permutation σ of (1, 2, . . . , n), if M(f1, f2, . . . , fn) = (A1, A2, . . . , An) and
M(fσ(1), fσ(2), . . . , fσ(n)) = (A
′
1, A
′
2, . . . , A
′
n), then vi(Ai) = vi(A
′
σ−1(i)) for every i.
• position obliviousness, if the following holds: For any vectors of density func-
tions f and f ′ such that Lf = Lf ′ , if M(f) = (A1, A2, . . . , An) and M(f
′) =
(A′1, A
′
2, . . . , A
′
n), then vi(Ai) = v
′
i(A
′
i) for every i.
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Intuitively, a mechanism is anonymous if the utility that the agents receive do not
depend on the identities of the agents, and position oblivious if the values that the
agents receive depend only on the lengths of the pieces desired by various subsets of
agents and not on the positions of these pieces.
3 Truthful Mechanisms for Two Agents
In this section, we focus on the case of two agents. We show that in this case, there
exists a truthful, envy-free, and Pareto optimal mechanism for both cake cutting and
chore division, for two agents with arbitrary piecewise uniform valuations.
4This is a weaker notion of position obliviousness than the one considered by Bei et al. [5]: Our definition
only requires that the agents get the same value if the indicator function of their density functions
remain the same, whereas Bei et al.’s definition also requires the pieces to be allocated in “equivalent”
ways.
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We first describe the cake cutting mechanism.
Mechanism 1 (for cake cutting between two agents)
Step 1: Find the smallest value of x ∈ [0, 1] such that v1([0, x]) = v2([x, 1]).
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Step 2: Assign to a1 the intervals in [0, x] valued by a1 and the intervals in [x, 1] not
valued by a2, and assign the rest of the cake to a2.
While this is a succinct description of the mechanism, it turns out that the description
is somewhat difficult to work with. We next provide an alternative formulation that is
more intuitive and will help us in establishing the claimed properties of the mechanism.
Mechanism 1 (alternative formulation)
Phase 1: Let a1 start at point 0 of the cake moving to the right and a2 start at
point 1 of the cake moving to the left. Let both agents “eat” the cake with the same
constant speed, jumping over any interval for which they have no value according
to their reported valuations. If the agents are at the same point while both are still
eating, go to Phase 3. Else, one of the agents has no more valued interval to eat; go
to Phase 2.
Phase 2: Assume that ai is the agent who has no more valued interval to eat. Let
ai stop and a3−i continue eating. If the agents are at the same point (either while
a3−i eats or while a3−i jumps over an interval of zero value), go to Phase 3. Else,
both agents have stopped but there is still unallocated cake between their current
points. In this case, let a3−i continue eating the unallocated cake until he is at the
same point as ai, and go to Phase 3.
Phase 3: Assume that both agents are at point x of the cake. (It is possible that the
two agents meet while both of them are jumping. In this case, we let a2 jump first.)
Assign any unallocated interval to the left of x to a2 and any unallocated interval
to the right of x to a1.
Theorem 1. Mechanism 1 is a truthful, envy-free, and Pareto optimal cake cutting
mechanism for two agents.
Proof. We begin with truthfulness. Note that there is no incentive for an agent to report
an interval that she does not value, since this can only result in the agent wasting time
eating such intervals. So the only potential deviation is for the agent to report a strict
subset of the intervals that she values. If the agent does not report intervals that she
5The existence of x is guaranteed by the intermediate value theorem.
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values, then the intervals that she jumps over before the agents meet will be lost to
the other agent, and the agent can use the extra time gained from not reporting these
intervals to eat intervals of no more than the same length. Moreover, not reporting
intervals after the agents meet has no effect on the outcome of the mechanism.
Next, for envy-freeness, it suffices to show that each agent gets at least half of her
valued intervals allocated in each phase. In Phase 1, each agent only gains intervals that
she values, and loses intervals that she values (due to the other agent’s eating) at no
more than the same speed. In Phase 2, the agent who continues eating can only gain
more, while the agent who has stopped eating has no more interval that she values. In
Phase 3, a1 has no unallocated interval to the left of x that she values, so she cannot
lose any unallocated interval that she values. The same argument holds for a2.
Finally, our mechanism allocates any interval valued by at least one agent to an agent
who values it. This establishes Pareto optimality.
Mechanism 1 gives rise to a dual mechanism for two-agent chore division that satisfies
the same set of properties.
Mechanism 2 (for chore division between two agents)
Step 1 : Use Mechanism 1 to find an initial allocation of the chore, treating the
chore valuations as cake valuations.
Step 2 : Swap the pieces of the two agents in the allocation from Step 1.
Theorem 2. Mechanism 2 is a truthful, envy-free, and Pareto optimal chore division
mechanism for two agents.
Proof. First, truthfulness holds because minimizing the chore in the swapped allocation
is equivalent to maximizing the chore in the initial allocation, and Theorem 1 shows that
this is exactly what Mechanism 1 incentivizes the agents to do. Next, envy-freeness holds
again by Theorem 1 because getting at most half of the chore in the swapped allocation
is equivalent to getting at least half of the chore in the initial allocation. Finally, in the
initial allocation any interval of the chore valued by only one agent is allocated to that
agent, so in the swapped allocation the interval is allocated to the other agent, implying
that the mechanism is Pareto optimal.
Besides truthfulness, envy-freeness, and Pareto optimality, how do Mechanisms 1 and
2 fare with respect to the other properties defined in Section 2?
• Mechanism 1 is not anonymous: If W1 = [0, 0.5] and W2 = [0, 1] then both agents
get value 0.5, while if W1 = [0, 1] and W2 = [0, 0.5] then a1 gets value 0.75 and a2
gets value 0.25.
• It is also not position oblivious: If W1 = [0, 0.5] and W2 = [0, 1] then both agents
get value 0.5, while if W1 = [0.5, 1] and W2 = [0, 1] then a1 gets value 0.25 and a2
gets value 0.75.
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• The allocation when W1 = [0, 1] and W2 = [0, 0.5] shows that the mechanism does
not satisfy the connected piece assumption.
The same examples demonstrate that Mechanism 2 likewise satisfies none of the three
properties. As we show in the next section, these negative results are in fact not restricted
to the two mechanisms that we consider here, but rather apply to all possible cake cutting
and chore division mechanisms.
4 Impossibility Results
In this section, we present a number of impossibility results on the existence of fair
and truthful mechanisms that satisfy certain additional properties, for both cake cutting
and chore division. Interestingly, all of the impossibility results cease to hold if the
mechanism is not required to allocate the entire resource, which again highlights the
crucial difference that the free disposal assumption makes.
We begin with anonymity. One might expect that a “fair” mechanism should treat
the agents equally regardless of their identity. However, the following result shows that
anonymity is incompatible with truthfulness and envy-freeness.
Theorem 3. There does not exist a truthful, envy-free, and anonymous cake cutting
mechanism for two agents, even when each agent values a single interval of the form
[0, xi].
Proof. Suppose that such a mechanism exists. Let x ∈ [0, 1) and W1 = W2 = [0, x].
Assume without loss of generality that in this instance, a1 gets an interval containing
point x and ending at point x + f(x) > x, possibly among other intervals. By envy-
freeness, both agents must get half of the interval [0, x].
If W1 = [0, x + ǫ] for some ǫ ∈ [0, f(x)] and W2 = [0, x], then a1 must get the
entire interval [x, x + ǫ] and half of the interval [0, x]. This is because a2 must get at
least half of the interval [0, x], and if a1 gets less than the whole interval [x, x + ǫ], she
can manipulate by reporting W1 = [0, x] and getting the whole interval [x, x + ǫ]. By
anonymity, if W1 = [0, x] and W2 = [0, x+ ǫ] for some ǫ ∈ [0, f(x)], a2 must also get the
whole interval [x, x+ ǫ] and half of the interval [0, x].
Now suppose that W1 = W2 = [0, x + ǫ] for some ǫ ∈ [0, f(x)]. Both agents must get
half of the interval [0, x + ǫ]. If a1 gets more than half of the interval [x, x+ ǫ], then a2
gets more than half of the interval [0, x]. In this case, if W2 = [0, x], a2 can manipulate
by reportingW2 = [0, x+ǫ]. So a1 cannot get more than half of the interval [x, x+ǫ]. By
symmetry, neither can a2. This means that both agents get exactly half of the interval
[x, x+ ǫ]. In other words, for any y ∈ [x, x+f(x)], if W1 = W2 = [0, y], then both agents
get exactly half of the interval [x, y].
Next, consider the set
A := {(x, y) ∈ R[0,1) ×Q[0,1] | x < y < x+ f(x)}.
This set is uncountable, since for each of the uncountably many x’s, there is at least one
y such that (x, y) ∈ A. If for each y there only exist a finite number of x’s such that
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(x, y) ∈ A, this set would be countable, which we know is not the case. Hence there
exists a y such that (x, y) ∈ A for infinitely many x’s. Fix such a y.
Finally, suppose that W1 = W2 = [0, y]. For any of the infinitely many x’s such that
(x, y) ∈ A, both agents must receive exactly half of the interval [x, y]. However, if the
mechanism divides the interval [0, y] into k intervals in the allocation, then there can be
at most one value of x per interval, and therefore at most k values in total, with this
property. Since k is finite, this gives us the desired contradiction.
We remark that with the free disposal assumption, Chen et al.’s mechanism is a
truthful, envy-free, and anonymous cake cutting mechanism for two agents with arbitrary
piecewise uniform valuations. The same authors showed that a particular extension of
their mechanism, which allocates the desired pieces of the cake in the same way as their
mechanism and allocates the undesired pieces of the cake in a certain simple way, is
not truthful [9, p. 296]. Since any mechanism that allocates the desired pieces of the
cake in this way is also anonymous, Theorem 3 shows that no extension of Chen et al.’s
mechanism can be truthful.
Next, we turn to the connected piece assumption.
Theorem 4. There does not exist a truthful and envy-free cake cutting mechanism for
two agents that satisfies the connected piece assumption, even when each agent values a
single interval of the form [0, xi].
Proof. Suppose that such a mechanism exists. First, consider the instance where W1 =
W2 = [0, x] for some x ∈ (0, 1). One agent will get the interval [0, x/2] and the other
agent the interval [x/2, 1]; assume without loss of generality that a1 gets [0, x/2] and
a2 gets [x/2, 1]. Next, consider the instance where W1 = [0, x] and W2 = [0, y] for
some y ∈ (x, 1). Then a2 must still get the interval [x/2, 1]; otherwise she can report
W2 = [0, x] instead.
Now, consider the instance where W1 = W2 = [0, y]. As before, one agent will get
the interval [0, y/2] and the other agent the interval [y/2, 1]. If a1 gets [0, y/2], then in
the previous instance a1 can gain more by reporting W1 = [0, y]. Hence it must be that
a2 gets [0, y/2] and a1 gets [y/2, 1]. This means that in the instance where both agents
report [0, y], the ordering of the allocated pieces is reversed from the allocation in the
instance where both agents report [0, x]. Since this holds for any y > x, if we take some
z > y (obviously z > x also), we find that no allocation works when both agents report
[0, z], a contradiction.
Bei et al. [5] showed that a similar impossibility result holds even with the free disposal
assumption, but using the larger class of piecewise constant valuations. For the class
of valuations that we consider in Theorem 4, there exists a simple truthful and envy-
free mechanism that always returns a connected allocation assuming free disposal. The
mechanism works as follows: Assume that agent ai declares Wi = [0, xi] for i = 1, 2. If
x1 ≥ x2, allocate the interval [x1/2, x1] to a1 and [0, x1/2] to a2; otherwise allocate the
interval [0, x2/2] to a1 and [x2/2, x2] to a2. One can check that this mechanism satisfies
the claimed properties.
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We now consider position obliviousness and show the nonexistence of a truthful, envy-
free, and position oblivious cake cutting mechanism for two agents. In fact, we prove
a more general statement that holds for any even number of agents and also uses the
weaker notion of proportionality.
Theorem 5. Let n = 2k for some positive integer k. There does not exist a truthful,
proportional, and position oblivious cake cutting mechanism for n agents.
Proof. Suppose that such a mechanism exists. Assume that the cake is represented by
the interval [0, 4k2 + k].
First, consider the instance where W2i−1 = W2i = [i − 1, i] for i = 1, 2, . . . , k. Since
the interval [k, 4k2 + k] is of length 4k2 and there are 2k agents, some agent gets value
more than 2k−1 from the interval. Assume without loss of generality that a1 is one such
agent, and that a1 gets the interval [k, 3k − 1]. Since the mechanism is proportional, a1
must get value at least 1/2k from the interval [0, 1] as well.
Next, consider the instance where W1 = [0, 1] ∪ [k, 3k − 1], W2 = [0, 1], and W2i−1 =
W2i = [i − 1, i] for i = 2, 3, . . . , k. Agent a1 must still get value at least 1/2k from the
interval [0, 1]; otherwise she can report W1 = [0, 1] instead. This means that a2 gets a
total value of at most 1− 1/2k in this instance.
Finally, consider the instance where W1 = W2 = [0, 1] ∪ [k, 3k − 1] and W2i−1 =
W2i = [i−1, i] for i = 2, 3, . . . , k. By proportionality, a2 must receive value at least 1; let
B2 ⊆ [0, 1]∪ [k, 3k−1] be a piece of length 1 that a2 receives. IfW2 = B2 while the other
Wi’s remain fixed, then since the mechanism is position oblivious, a2 must get a total
value of at most 1−1/2k. However, in that case a2 can reportW2 = [0, 1]∪[k, 3k−1] and
receive value 1. This implies that the mechanism is not truthful and yields the desired
contradiction.
As with the connected piece assumption, Bei et al. [5] showed a similar negative result
for position obliviousness with the free disposal assumption but using the larger class of
piecewise constant valuations. For piecewise uniform valuations, Chen et al.’s mechanism
is truthful, envy-free, and position oblivious under the free disposal assumption.
We end this section by showing that our impossibility results also carry over to chore
division. The idea is the same as the one used in Mechanism 2, except that here we use
it to establish negative results.
Corollary 1. There does not exist a truthful and envy-free chore division mechanism
for two agents if one of the following conditions is added: (i) anonymity; (ii) connected
piece assumption; (iii) position obliviousness.
Proof. If there were a truthful and envy-free chore division mechanism that satisfies
one of the additional properties, we could obtain a cake cutting mechanism with the
same properties as follows: First, we use the chore division mechanism to compute an
initial allocation of the cake, treating the cake valuations as chore valuations. Then we
swap the pieces of the two agents in this allocation. However, the existence of a cake
cutting mechanism with these properties would contradict one of Theorems 3, 4, and 5,
respectively.
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5 Extensions to Multiple Agents
In this section, we consider the general setting where we allocate the resource among any
number of agents. We assume that each agent ai only values the interval [0, xi] for some
xi. Such valuations may appear in a scenario where the agents are dividing machine
processing time: agent ai has a deadline xi for her jobs, so she would like to maximize
the processing time she gets before xi but has no value for any processing time after
xi. We also remark that the example used to illustrate that removing the free disposal
assumption can be problematic consists of two agents whose valuations belong to this
class [9, p. 296]. Hence, designing a fair and truthful algorithm is by no means an easy
problem even for this valuation class.
We first describe the cake cutting mechanism.
Mechanism 3 (for cake cutting among n agents)
Step 1 : If there is one agent left, the agent gets the entire remaining cake. Else,
assume that there are k ≥ 2 agents and length l of the cake left. Find the maximum
x ∈ [0, l] such that agent i values the entire interval [(i−1)x, ix] for all i = 1, 2, . . . , k,
and allocate the interval [(i− 1)x, ix] to agent i.
Step 2 : The agent whose right endpoint of her allocated interval coincides with the
right endpoint of her valued piece exits the process. If there are more than one such
agent, choose the one with the lowest number.6
Step 3 : Renumber the remaining agents in the same order starting from 1, and
relabel the left endpoint of the remaining cake as point 0. Return to Step 1.
Theorem 6. Let n be any positive integer. Mechanism 3 is a truthful, envy-free, and
Pareto optimal cake cutting mechanism for n agents, if each agent only values a single
interval of the form [0, xi].
Proof. First, for truthfulness, there are two types of manipulation: moving xi to the left
and to the right. Moving xi to the left can only cause ai to quit the process early when
she could have gained more by staying on. On the other hand, if moving xi to the right
causes the allocation to change in some round of Step 1, the agent can only get less value
from the allocated interval as its right endpoint moves past xi. Moreover, since she has
no more valued intervals to the right, she cannot make up for the loss.
Next, for envy-freeness, if an agent is no longer in the process, she has no more piece
of value. During the process, in each round all remaining agents receive an interval of
the same length. Since each agent values the entire interval that she receives, she does
not envy any other agent.
6There must exist at least one such agent, since otherwise the value of x in Step 1 can be increased.
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Finally, our mechanism allocates any interval valued by at least one agent to an agent
who values it. This establishes Pareto optimality.
Unlike in the case of two agents, there is no simple reduction between cake cutting
and chore division in the general case. Nevertheless, our next result shows a truthful and
proportional chore division mechanism for any number of agents. We were not able to
strengthen the proportionality guarantee to envy-freeness and leave it as an interesting
open question for future research.
Mechanism 4 (for chore division among n agents)
Step 1 : Let a1 take the piece [0, x1/n] ∪ [x1, 1]. If some other agent has no value on
parts of the interval [0, x1/n], give those parts to the agent. (If there are several
such agents, allocate the parts arbitrarily.)
Step 2 : Repeat Step 1 with the next agent up to an−1 and the remaining chore;
agent ai takes the leftmost interval with value xi/n as well as any piece for which she
has no value. (If ai has value less than xi/n left, she takes the entire remaining chore.)
Step 3 : Agent an takes all of the remaining chore.
Theorem 7. Let n be any positive integer. Mechanism 4 is a truthful, proportional, and
Pareto optimal chore division mechanism for n agents, if each agent only values a single
interval of the form [0, xi].
Proof. We begin with truthfulness. First, any agent who has no value on some piece
that the mechanism initially allocates to another agent has no incentive not to take the
piece. Apart from this, agent an has no control over her allocation, so the mechanism is
truthful for her. For any other agent, there are two types of manipulation: moving xi to
the left and to the right. Moving xi to the right can only increase the value of the piece
that ai has to take. If ai moves xi to the left by an amount y, she can save a value of at
most y/n but has to take a piece of value y at the end. So ai does not have a profitable
manipulation.
We now consider proportionality. Each agent up to an−1 gets a piece of value at most
xi/n. For an, we consider two cases. Let x = min(x1, x2, . . . , xn−1). If xn ≤ x, then
each of the first n− 1 agents takes at least 1/n of the interval [0, xn], so at most 1/n of
this interval is left for an. Else, we have xn > x. The intervals [0, (n − 1)x/n] and [x, 1]
will not be left to an, meaning that an receives value at most x/n < xn/n.
Finally, our mechanism allocates any interval for which some agent has no value to
one such agent. This establishes Pareto optimality.
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6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we study the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous resource in the
presence of strategic agents and demonstrate the powers and limitations of truthful mech-
anisms in this setting. An immediate question is whether our mechanisms in Section 3
can be generalized to work for any number of agents with piecewise uniform valuations.
While our results in Section 5 provide a partial answer to this question, extending to
the general setting seems to require a drastically different idea. Indeed, it could also be
that there is an impossibility result once we move beyond the case of two agents.
Another direction is to allow agents to have valuations from a larger class. A natural
next step would be to consider the class of piecewise constant valuations, in which
an agent values each interval uniformly but can have different marginal utilities for
different intervals. It is not known whether there exists a deterministic truthful envy-
free mechanism even for two agents with piecewise constant valuations, either with or
without the free disposal assumption. We believe that this is a theoretically intriguing
and practically important question that should be resolved in future work.
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